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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Wardley Better Homes and Garden,
Respondent,
v.
Leland Mascaro, Sheri Mascaro,
Tracy Cannon and Cannon Associates,
Inc./ a Utah corporation,
Petitioner.

No. 20010245-SC
20000128-CA
940907000

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
filed on March 19, 2001, by petitioner is granted.

FOR THE COURT:

/Zug. 1, aoof
Date

Richard C. Howe
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on August 9, 2001, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
STEVEN B.
SCALLEY &
261 E 300
SALT LAKE

SMITH
READING
S STE 200
CITY UT 84111

MARK O. MORRIS
DAVID N. WOLF
SNELL & WILMER
15 W S TEMPLE #1200
GATEWAY TOWER W
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the courts listed
below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
PAULETTE STAGG
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20010245-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , 940907000

Tab 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,
Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING
CASE NO. 940907000

vs.
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI
MASCARO, and TRACEY CANNON,
Defendants.
LELAND J. MASCARO and
SHERI MASCARO,
Counterclaimaints,
vs.
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,
Counterdefendant.
LELAND J. MASCARO and
SHERI MASCARO,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
RUTH MARY HANSEN and
ARLES HANSEN,
Third Party Defendants.

A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Code

of Judicial Administration,

in connection

with

defendant

Tracey Cannon's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Motion
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for Leave to File Amended Complaint, the Court having reviewed the
Motions,

Memoranda

in

Support

and

Reply

Memorandum

and

the

Memoranda in Opposition, and the Court being fully advised and
finding good cause,
The Motion

rules as stated herein.
For

Summary

Judgment

was

therefore considered first by this Court.

filed

first and

is

The Motion for Summary

Judgment is denied because there are material facts at issue,
including what defendant, Cannon, knew or should have known and
when she obtained any knowledge she had, etc.
The Motion to Amend Complaint is granted.
that

this

Court

is

not

plaintiff's new claims.
assess

ruling^ on

the

It should be noted

viability

of

any

of

Plaintiff is urged to very carefully

the facts and law and only file those claims that can be

brought in good faith after a diligent exploration of the facts.
Plaintiff has ten days from the date of this Ruling to file
the Amended Complaint and an Order consistent with this Ruling.
Dated this H ^

day of October, 1996.

jd
LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

WARDLEY V. MASCARO
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this
October, 1996:

J. Craig Smith
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark O. Morris
SNELL Sc WILMER
Attorney for Defendant Cannon
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Steven W. Dougherty
ANDERSON Sc KARRENBERG
Attorney for Defendant Mascaro
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

/ -^

day of
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AUG 2 8 1998
SALT LA^COUNTY
/

/

Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
BETTER HOMES fi GARDENS,
WARDLEY

CASE NO. 940907000

Plaintiff
vs.
LELAND J . MASCARO,

it

al

Defendants.

LELAND J . MASCARO a n d SHERI
MASCARO,
Counterclaimants,

vs.
WARDLEY

BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,

Counterdefendant.
LELAND J- MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
VS.

BOT „ ^ * » — ^

s WNSEB

Third Party Defendants.

This case
1998.

'

=

b £ore the court for trial beginning on
ca^e before
th

and continuing through June 11.

•

JU ne

8,

PAGE TWO

WARDLEY V. MASCARO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

received testimony and heard argument from counsel, ruled from the
bench that the plaintiffs had not established a cause of action
against defendant Tracy Cannon with respect to their claim that
defendant Tracy Cannon's conduct violated the Utah Administrative
Code.

Specifically, the Court found that defendant Tracy Cannon's

conduct was not unprofessional or unethical under the totality of
the facts and circumstances and based upon the testimony of certain
witnesses, including defendant Tracy Cannon and Rodney "Butch"
Dailey, whom the Court found to be credible.

The Court also ruled

that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof in connection
with

their

claim

that

defendant

Tracy

Cannon

intentionally

interfered with the plaintiff's prospective economic relations with
respect

to

the

Wetcor/Michael

Ahlin

deal,

the

Michael

Brodsky/Hamlet Development deal and the Boulder deal (see factual
discussion below).

Further, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs

had not met their burden of proof as to their claim that defendant
Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the
defendant
conversion.

Mascaros'

property

to

the

plaintiff

constituted

The remaining issues raised in the Second Amended

Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Third Party Complaint were

WARDLEY V. MASCARO
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ft irther, morp "in -depth

taken under advisement by the Court ^ r

EAC1UM, BACKGROUND
This

Court, f i n d s
r

. • -:a» ' . ] : ; •
defendants

that

credible

loilowine

and third-parly

t , jt :m ;r; a<rr.i<

fact?

'ascaros

p^^iii: id:,,

wei . fii'.t

("Mascaros")
.• j.la. M d

,

1:1 :i i rd-party defendant- Aries Hansen

("Mr, Hansen7') in M «" summei ui

1993.

. i -

Mr

plaintiff
1

Hansen, u.. ;*vpni: « = ••;
and counterdefendant

Wardley

* xaros

selling approximately
.'r-

l^H

ar»o:

•

' '.o rc-nt
Home:

were

hardens

infpfpqtpp

«;i i^al property

i: tua*- area f, .

Af ter his ,>. * - , .. . me* • I

Mascaro") at ;

and
t

.

r

. cna*

third-party
. .

i

iII>

plaintlM

» Wetcor.

.i i <
oheri
" *^ n

• sen met

' -i'tiuri a g r e e m e n t

/M

Mascdn

^rc

~ 4 oreeir' n*

M a s c a r o s i q n e d , but d i d not d,tt e, t h e Opt rui j g r e e m e n t
t -' 'ii

j r,

wt

President ^f Impact Development Corporation <tM

defendant

-s : the

Hansen informed the Nasrai >s that he-

was lookin-'i fo: property

with

Better

%

.,,J:^«^

.• ;.

'

-1 * '

• < .a;.,:

i n ^ l u ^ f •' .% ~ * d a y

duration and gave M r . Hansen, and his fi f r\ * mrci pa;"

> . L . rut<
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Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen"), or their assigns, the right to
purchase the Mascaros' property.
When Mr. Hansen discovered that defendant and

third-party

plaintiff Leland Mascaro

("Mr.-Mascaro") was the actual owner of

the property,

the Mascaros

he

asked

to sign

a

second

Option

agreement {Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 ) . The terms of the second Option
agreement, dated September 14, 1993, were identical to the first
Option agreement and was signed by both the Mascaros.

According to

the trial testimony, it was also on this date that Mrs. Mascaro
informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West Inc. ("Century 21")
had an exclusive listing agreement on the property.

The Century 21

listing agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30) had been signed by Mr.
Mascaro on May 28, 1993, and provided for a six month duration.
The Court found Mr. Hansen's testimony that he was not aware of the
Century 21 agreement was lacking in credibility.

To the contrary,

the Court finds that the Century 21 agreement was disclosed to Mr.
Hansen and that he requested Mrs. Mascaro to obtain a one-party
exemption from Mr. Jerard Dinkelman, the principal broker under the
Century

21

Agreement.

Mrs.

Mascaro

obtained

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29) on September 14, 1993.

the

exemption

This exemption was

acquired before the second Option agreement was executed.
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It further appears from the testimony that when Mr. Ahlin did
not make an immediate offer, Mr, Hansen engaged in other actions
with

the

Mascaros,

including

having

them

write

a

letter

(Plaintiffs Exhibit 3), dated October 6, 1993, to put pressure on
Mr. Ahlin to make the deal.

Mrs. Mascaro conceded at trial that

this letter, stating that she and her husband had been contacted by
another developer offering ernest money on the parcels, was a
fabrication.
On October 12, -1993, Mr. Ahlin made an offer on the property
through a Real Estate Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) of
the same date.

In addition to the Real Estate Purchase Contract,

Mr. Hansen prepared a Dual Agency Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4)
which was signed by Mr. Ahlin and Mrs. Hansen.

The Court finds

this Agreement is significant because Mr. Hansen had continuously
represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively.
In addition, Mr. Rod Gordon testified that he was Mr. Ahlin's agent
and that it was inappropriate for the Hansens to present a Dual
Agency Agreement for Mr. Ahlin's consideration and signature.

Also

of significance is the Sales Agency Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit
4) which the Hansens prepared for the Mascaros' signature.

A hand-

written notation on the top of this contract expressly states that
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it is a single party listing and that the single party is Wetcor.
All of these documents were sent to the Mascaros and to their legal
counsel, Mr. Mitch Olsen.

Mr. Olsen testified that he advised the

Mascaros not to sign the documents and offered to draft an original
real

estate purchase

contract

which

included

a provision

for

commission to be paid to the Hansens in the event that Mr. Ahlin
consummated the purchase of the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16),
Based

on Mr. Olsen's advice, the Mascaros did not act on Mr.

Ahlin's offer but continued to negotiate with him.

In addition,

the testimony is clear that no listing agreement was ever executed
or contemplated by the Mascaros at that time.
On November 14, 1993, Mr. Hansen came to the Mascaros' home
with a number of documents.
Option

Agreement

At this meeting, Mr. Hansen brought an

(Defendant's

Exhibit

89), a

Limited

Agency

Disclosure Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), a blank Real Estate
Purchase

Contract

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit

26), and

four

listing

agreements ("Listing Agreements") with Salt Lake Board of Realtors
Land Data Input Forms
testimony,

Mr.

Hansen

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 - 2 0 ) .
acknowledged

that

in

In his

preparing

documents the night before, he had predated many of them.

these
The

Court finds that Mr. Hansen's preparation of these documents was
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unsolicited and that Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros on
a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel.

It appears

to the Court that Mr. Hansen's urgency in preparing these documents
and having the Mascaros sign them was based on the expiration of
the second Option agreement.

It further appears from the Mascaros'

testimony that Mr. Hansen's scheme was to have the Mascaros present
an offer to Mr. Ahlin with the expectation that he would purchase
a small portion of the acreage and agree to an option on the
remainder of the land.

However, because the Mascaros and Mr.

Hansen did not yet know how many acres Mr. Ahlin would actually be
willing to purchase, the principle terms of the Real Estate
Purchase Contract were left blank.

In addition, only the first of

the four Listing Agreements contained an expiration date.
The Court finds that the first Listing Agreement (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 17A) , in its unaltered state, reflects the actual agreement
between the Mascaros and Mr. Hansen.

This Listing Agreement was

set-to expire^on November 15, 1993, one day after Mr. Hansen's
Sunday meeting with the Mascaros.

The Court finds that Mr. Hansen

altered the date on this Listing Agreement from November 15, 1993
to November 15, 1994.

This finding is based on the credible

testimony of the Mascaros and the Court's comparison of documents

WARDLEY V. MASCARO
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where changes are initialed (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), with the
Listing Agreement marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17A, where the
change in the expiration date has no initials.

The Court further

finds that with respect to the other three Listing Agreements,
which were blank with respect to the expiration dates, these were
filled in by

Mr. Hansen, subsequent to the Mascaros' signature,

with "November 14, 1994" dates. The credible testimony established
that Mr. Hansen's conduct

in changing and/or writing

in the

expiration dates, was engaged in without the knowledge and the
approval of the Mascaros.

In addition, the dates alluded to and

written by Mr. Hansen were contrary to the parties' agreement and
clear understanding that the Listing Agreements would expire in one
day.
This Court also finds that Mr. Ahlin did subsequently sign
both the Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract,
and Mrs. Hansen accepted

an earnest money check

for $4,000.

Further, it is clear that the deal between the Mascaros and Mr.
Ahlin subsequently failed.

After an attempt to arbitrate the

matter of the earnest money, the title company released the $4,000
earnest money to Mr. Ahlin's assignees.
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This Court also finds that around this same time, another
potential purchaser of the property, Michael Brodsky, President of
Hamlet Development, began to negotiate with the Mascaros.
Brodsky

testified

that he proposed purchasing

Mr.

the property

in

stages and thought that he and the Mascaros had reached a verbal
agreement

on

the

sale.

, However,

before

the

agreement

was

finalized, Mr. Brodsky was informed by the Mascaros that a sale of
the property had occurred.
signed

a

Associates.

one

year

In

listing

September

agreement

1994,

with

the

Mascaros

defendant

Cannon

In October 1994, the Mascaros signed a Real Estate

Purchase Agreement

agreeing

to sell the property

Tracey Cannon ("Ms. Cannon").

to

defendant

The Mascaros and Ms. Cannon closed

on this property on May 11, 1995.

Ms. Cannon received a commission

from the sale of $115,338.16.
LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Court determines
that the listing
aorre^m^nf-<? entered
into
between
Wardley
and the Mascaros
are
voidable
because they vere secured by fraud in the
inducement.
In its Second Amended

Complaint, Wardley

claims

that

the

Mascaros have breached their Listing Agreements with Wardley by
refusing to pay Wardley

the 7% commission provided

for in the

Listing Agreements upon the sale of the property to M s . Cannon.

WARDLEY V. MASCARO
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Wardley argues that the sale to Ms. Cannon was entered into within
the one-year term of the Listing Agreements.

According to Wardley,

when the sale on the property to Ms. Cannon closed, the contractual
requirements for Wardley's earned commission had been satisfied.
In

their

Counterclaim

and

Third

Party

Complaint

against

Wardley and the Hansens, the Mascaros contend they were induced to
sign the Listing Agreements in reliance on false representations
made to them by Mr. Hansen.

The representations which the Mascaros

claim were fraudulent are:

(1) that Mr. Hansen told them that he

would only receive a commission

for the sale of the Mascaros'

property to Wetcor if they signed the Listing Agreements and (2)
that the Listing Agreements would be valid for only one day and
would apply only to the Wetcor purchase.

The Mascaros also claim

that Wardley breached its contract with them by failing to list the
property on the MLS, and by failing to appropriately market the
property.
Under Utah law, a person may rely upon positive assertions
made by another, Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980),
and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid
the contract.

Berkely Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d

WARDLEY V. MASCARO

798, 801-04 (Utah 1980).
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The nine essential elements of fraudulent

inducement (fraud) are:
"(1) that a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact;
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge
upon
which
to
base
such
representation;
(5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act
(9) to his injury and damage,"
Meibos, 607 P.2d at 800.
The Court determines that the Mascaros have proven fraudulent
inducement because they have presented evidence supporting all of
its elements.

This Court finds most significant the fact that

there are inconsistencies between the written terms of the Listing
Agreements and the Mascaros' expressed intention to limit Mr.
Hansen's representation to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and to limit the
duration of his representation to one day.

These inconsistencies

can only be reconciled with a finding that Mr. Hansen fraudulently
represented that the Listing Agreements would be limited to oneparty and would expire in one day to induce the Mascaros to sign
the Listing Agreements.

As part of his fraudulent scheme, the
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Court finds that Mr. Hansen altered the November 15, 1993, date
which was originally found on the first Listing Agreement and added
expiration dates to the remaining

three Listing Agreements

reflect an unagreed and unintended one-year duration.
Mr.

Hansen

improperly

unilaterally

modified

the

Listing

It appears

Agreements

expand the scope of his representation beyond

contemplated by the Mascaros.

to

to
that

The Court finds that Mr. Hansen's

modifications were made without the Mascaros' knowledge and at a
time when they did not have counsel available on the benefit of
necessary legal advice.

Based on the Mascaros' testimony, which

the Court found to be credible, they were induced into signing
incomplete
meeting,

drafts

when

of

their

the
legal

Listing

Agreements

counsel was

during

apparently

a

Sunday

unavailable,

because of Mr. Hansen's representation that it was the only way for
him to receive a commission on the deal and his assurances that the
final

version

limitations

of

they

the
had

Listing
discussed.

Agreements
In

would

addition,

contain

the

the Mascaros'

testified that they failed to take any additional precautions such
as filling out the blank spaces because of their belief that Mr.
Hansen had their best interests in mind.

On this topic, the Court

found Mrs. Mascaro's statement that "blind trust walked in and care

WARDLEY V, MASCARO
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walked out" to be a particularly compelling statement concerning
the Mascaros' reliance upon Mr. Hansen's representations and the
opportunity for deception by Mr, Hansen.

The Court finds that Mr.

Hansen took full advantage of this opportunity by arriving for a
hastily scheduled meeting with the Mascaros, whom Mr. Hansen knew
to be represented by legal counsel, on a Sunday, when counsel would
be unlikely to be available.
Overall, the Court found that the Mascaros' belief that they
were operating under a one-day, one-party listing agreement was
corroborated by documents received into evidence and the totality
of credible trial testimony.
Contract

For instance, the Sale Agency

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) presented to the Mascaros and

signed by Mrs. Hansen imparts the Hansens' acknowledgment of the
Mascaros' expressed intention to limit the Hansens' listing to "a
single party listing . . . The single party is Wetcor."

Further,

the Court finds that Mr. Hansen was aware of the Century 21 Listing
and was fully cognizant he could represent the Mascaros only if he
could obtain a one-party exemption. Mr. Hansen's request that Mrs.
Mascaro obtain a one-party exemption from Century 21 is congruent
with

the

Mascaros'

express

reservations

that

their

listing

agreement with the Hansens be limited to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and
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with the Hansens' recognition that their representation had to be
limited to one-party so as not run afoul of the Century 21 Listing.
Next,

it is significant

to the Court

that the

change

in the

expiration date on the first Listing Agreement was not initialed.
When compared to other documents where changes were initialed by
the Mascaros, the lack of initials on the altered expiration date
strongly suggests to the Court that the date was modified after the
Mascaros signed this Listing Agreement and without their knowledge
or permission.

The Hansens' actions and the trail of documents

speak loudly and convincingly that the Mascaros signed the Listing
Agreements

only

because

of

Mr.

Hansen's

fraudulent

misrepresentations and false assurances concerning the duration and
scope of these agreements.

In reaching this determination, the

Court has given due consideration to all of the evidence, including
the Mascaros' confessed lack of expertise in real estate matters
and the particular facts surrounding Mr. Hansen's insistence that
they sign the Listing Agreements on a Sunday, when they did not
have access to their legal counsel.

The existence of these proven

facts in this case defeats Wardley's recovery upon the Listing
Agreements.

This Court concludes it would be inequitable, would be
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unjust, and unlawful for this Court to enforce agreements, procured
through fraudulent inducement.
The Court notes that there are also other possible grounds on
which

the Mascaros

could

avoid

liability

Agreements, including the doctrine of mistake.

under

the

Listing

However, since the

Court finds that the Listing Agreements are voidable on the grounds
of

fraudulent

inducement,

the Court deems

it unnecessary

to

consider alternative theories.
To summarize, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim
that the Mascaros breached the Listing Agreements.

Specifically,

the Court rules that the Listing Agreements are unenforceable.
Further, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim that Ms.
Cannon interfered with Wardley's economic relations with respect to
the Mascaros.

Since the Listing Agreements were unenforceable,

Wardley did not have viable economic relations with the Mascaros,
with which Ms. Cannon could interfere.
With respect to the Mascaros' Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint, the Court's ruling that the Listing Agreements are
unenforceable

renders moot the Mascaros' claim that they are

entitled to attorney's fees and costs as specified within the terms
of the Listing Agreements.

In other words, in disaffirming the
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of the Listing Agreements, the Mascaros

selectively

reinstate

only

certain

portions

Agreements which are favorable to them.

cannot
of

the

seek to
Listing

The same concept applies

to the Mascaros' claim that Wardley breached the terms of the
Listing

Agreements.

As

stated

previously,

since

fraudulent

inducement has been proven, the terms of the Listing Agreement are
not enforceable or binding on either the Mascaros or Wardley.

In

so ruling, the Court has essentially placed the Mascaros in the
same position that they were in before the Listing Agreements were
executed.
With respect to the Mascaros' claim for damages on fraud, it
is this Court's view that the Mascaros have been restored to their
former position by this Court's determination that the Listing
Agreements

are

void.

Moreover,

while

the Mascaros

may

have

suffered emotional angst over the Hansens' conduct and whether
their property would be

sold,

there is no evidence

distress resulted in any compensatory damages.

that

this

As a corollary, the

Mascaros have not presented any evidence that they have suffered a
pecuniary loss, particularly in light of their sale of the property
to Ms. Cannon under more beneficial terms than were offered by the

WARDLEY V. MASCARO

Ahlin/Wetcor deal-
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Accordingly, the Court denies the Mascaros'

claim for damages.
Counsel for the Mascaros is to prepare an Order and Findings
consistent with, but not limited to the content of this Ruling
within fifteen (15) days.
Dated this J-0

day of August, 1998.

n

LESLIE AJ LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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James C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendants Mascaro
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark O. Morris
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Tab 4

APR 2 1 1939

Steven B. Smith, #5797
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261 East 300 South, Suite 200
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,

)
)

ORDER DENYING
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO,
TRACEY CANNON and ASSOCIATES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

;)
]

Civil No. 940907000 CN

])

Judge: Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants Tracey Cannon and Cannon and Associates ("Cannon") and
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro
("Mascaros"), after a trial in the above matter, petitioned the Court for an award of attorney's
fees from Plaintif&TTiird Party Defendant, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley"),
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56. Memoranda in support and in opposition to
those Motions were filed and those Motions were submitted for decision. The Court having
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and being fully informed, now makes and enters the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both Cannons and Mascaros claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant

to Section 78-27-56 (1) contending that Wardley's claims were meritless and asserted in bad
faith.
2.

Wardley's claims, however, were not "without merit."

3.

Even though the listing agreements entered between Wardley and the

Mascaros were voidable because of the misconduct of Arlis Hansen, the legality of the listing
agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal questions which were not entirely clear.
There was no evidence presented that Wardley independently knew of Mr. Hansen's
fraudulent conduct, and there was evidence that Wardley strongly believed that it had a valid
claim for unpaid commissions. The evidence indicated: (a) Wardley had an honest belief in
the propriety of the activities in question; (b) Wardley did not intend to take unconscionable
advantage of others; and (c) Wardley did not intend to or act with knowledge that its
activities would hinder, delay, and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Cannon and Mascaros failed to demonstrate that Wardley's claims were

"frivolous," or "of little weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact" as set forth in
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
2.

Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith.

3.

The totality of facts and circumstances would make it inequitable to

force Wardley to pay Cannons' and Mascaros' attorney's fees.

DATED this L^l'

day of Marchr 1999
By the Court:

1

>~/

-l/'fL

IUASO

Judge Leslie Lewis

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

\3&

day of March, 1999, a true and correct copy of
I hereby certify that on the
Wardley's Order Denying Attorney's Fees was deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
James C. Haskins, Esq.
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark O. Morris, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
John Bucher, Esq.
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

~y^A^
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Tab 5

Mark O. Morris (4636)
David N. Wolf (6688)
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

111 E.Broadway, Suite900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004
Telephone: (801)237-1900
Facsimile: (801) 237-1950

HUB BiSTWC? C08RT
Third Judicial District

JAN I 1 2UUU

Attorneys for Defendants Tracy Cannon and
Cannon Associates, Inc.

SALT UKE£0UNT¥
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES and
GARDEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINAL ORDER OF JUDGMENT
Case No. 940907000CN
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis

LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI
MASCARO, TRACY CANNON and
CANNON ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Defendants,
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Counter Claimants,
vs.
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES AND
GARDENS,
Counter Defendants,

LELAND J. MASCARO, and SHERI
MASCARO,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES
HANSEN,
Third-Party Defendants,

On January 29,1999, the Court entered its Partial Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs First, Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief against the
Mascaros and Plaintiffs Second and Fourth Claims for Relief against Ms. Cannon. In addition,
the Court entered a judgment of no cause as to the Mascaros' First, Third and Fourth
Counterclaims against Wardley and the Hansens, and denied any claims for relief under the
Mascaros' Second Cause of Action against the Hansens.
During the trial of this matter which came before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on
June 8, 1998 through June 11, 1998, the Court ruled from the bench, finding no cause for
Plaintiffs Third and Fifth Claims for Relief.
After trial, the Mascaros and Cannon filed motions for attorney's fees and costs.
Wardley opposed the motions for attorney's fees and filed objections to the defendants' claimed
costs. On April 21, 1999, this Court entered its order denying the Cannons' motion for attorneys
fees. On October 19, 1999, this Court also denied the Mascaros' motion for attorney's fees.

2

JUDGMENT
! JC )V\ " Tl IERHFORE, in accordance with the Court's ruling from the bench during the
trial on this matter, and further in accordance with the C n m T s Piiiiial Findings ol"f\ji I ,nnl
I i m c i u s i o n s ot ! aw. and Judgment dated January 29, 1999, a conv of which is attached hereto
and incorporated her m i ,
1

*

• :•

,

• :ugiiK.nt:

Dismissing Plaintiffs First, Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief against the

Mascaros;

•' ;

r

2.

Dismissing Plaintiff s Second and Foi ii th ' Linns I w RHiVI <j»><iin I l.li - i 'aimon;

3.

Dismissing Mascaros' First, Third and Fourth Counterclaims against Wardley and

(HP^US;

4
Denying any claims for relief under the Mascaros" Second Cause of \ ction
against the Hansens;
5.

Dismissing Plaintiffs

6.

Denying Defendants' motions for attorney's fees.

TIHMI ,HMI

fifth < l i m i " I'm Relief,

M IS SO ORDERED.
i . - -uh

i ! _ day of

Yrff]

, 2000.

BY THE COURT:

<L
Honorable Eeslie A. Lewis
Third District Court Judge
27129.0003\HILLC\SLCU06744.2

JIUI

James C Haskins (USB #1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P. C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone- (801) 539-0234
Facsimile- (801) 539-5210

1 b > -i

Attorneys for Leland J Mascaro and
Sheri Mascaro

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
WARDLE Y BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND J MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO,
TRACEY CANNON and CANNON
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendants.

PARTIAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
JUDGMENT

LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI MASCARO,
Counter Claimants,
v.
Civil No. 940907000CN
WARDLBY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Counter Defendant.

LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI MASCARO, :
Third Party Plaintiffs,

:

v.
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES HANSEN,
Third Party Defendants.
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Leslie A Lewis on June 8, 1998
through June 11, 1998. Plaintiff and Counter Defendant Wardley Better Homes and Gardens
("Wardley") and Third Party Defendants Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen") and Aries Hansen
("Mr. Hansen") were represented by attorneys Neil R. Sabin, J. Craig Smith, and Annette
Sorensen. Defendants, Counter Claimants, and Third Party Plaintiffs Leland J. Mascaro ("Mr.
Mascaro" or collectively the "Mascaros") and Sheri Mascaro ("Mrs. Mascaro" or collectively the
"Mascaros") were represented by James C. Haskins and William D. Darden. Defendants Tracy
Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc. ("Mrs. Cannon") were represented by Mark 0. Morris and
David N. Wolf. After considering the testimony of witnesses and the documentary evidence
presented at the trial and legal authorities cited by the parties, the Court, ruling from the bench,
found no cause for Wardley's Third and Fifth Claims of Relief. The Partial Findings of Fact,
Conclusions or Law, and Order for those claims have been previously submitted to the Court.
With regard to all other Wardley claims, the Mascaro counterclaims, and Third Party claims, the
Court hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr Hansen approached Mrs. Mascaro and asked if she would be interested in

selling 128 acres of real property to Michael L. Ahlin ("Mr. Ahlin") d/b/a Wetcor. At that
meeting, Mrs. Mascaro stated that if Mr. Hansen had a specific buyer for the property, she would
be interested in selling it to that individual or entity.
2.

Until the deal with Wetcor failed, all subsequent discussions between the Mascaros

and Mr Hansen involved the purchase of the property by Wetcor.
3.

At the initial meeting, Mrs. Mascaro signed an option agreement which gave Mr.

and Mrs. Hansen a twenty day option to purchase the property.
4.

After he discovered that Mr. Mascaro was the actual owner of the property, Mr.

Hansen asked the Mascaros to sign a second option agreement, which was dated September 14,
1998. This second option agreement was good for two months but the remainder of its terms
were similar to the first option agreement.
5.

Sometime prior to the execution of the second option agreement, Mrs. Mascaro

informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West, Inc. ("Century 21") had a six month exclusive
listing agreement on the property which would expire on November 28, 1998.
6.

Mr. Hansen told Wardley about the Century 21 listing Agreement, and Wardley

asked Mr. Hansen to get a written exemption.
7.

Mr. Hansen then asked Mrs. Mascaro to get a one-party exemption from Century

3

21 That written exemption was acquired before the Mascaros signed the second option
agreement.
8.

During this time period, the Mascaros informed Mr. Hansen the terms of the deal

for the property must include a Section 1031, Internal Revenue Service Code, tax free exchange.
9.

Mr. Ahlen did not make an immediate offer on the property following the

execution of the second option agreement, so Mr. Hansen asked Mrs. Mascaro to write a letter
to him stating that another developer was interested in the property. The purpose of this letter
was to put pressure on Mr. Ahlin to make a deal.
10.

Mr. Ahlin finally made an offer on the property through a Real Estate Purchase

Contract which Mr. Hansen had prepared and which was dated October 12, 1993. Also included
in the packet of documents presented to the Mascaros and their attorney by Mr. Hansen was a
Sales Agency Contract which had written across the top in Mrs. Hansen's handwriting: "This is a
single party listing and that single party is Wetcor."
11.

Besides the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Sales Agency Contract, Mr.

Hansen provided to the Mascaros a Dual Agency Agreement which he had also prepared and
which had been executed by Mrs. Hansen and Mr. Ahlen. Prior to this time, Mr. Hansen had
continuously represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively. At this time,
another Wardley representative was Mr. Ahlen's agent; therefore, it was improper for Mr. Hansen
to present and have Mr. Ahlen sign the Dual Agency Agreement.

4

Tht Mascaros' attorney advised them m «l i
draft an origm..

-

11,11 IM> M: doamu'nts, and offered to

-Tact which included a provision which would pay Mr.

*-n a commission should Mr. Allien purchase the property.
11

The Mascaros based upon llii'ii ,if hinry's

Kirn did not accept this offer but

if1"" "»'Mi Mr. Ahlin.

cor itiniiinl 10
1 1.

'iocause the second option agreement was set to e,\piit,\ (^ 1r I Iwisrn requested a

meeting with the Mascaros at i - • -

a Sunday, November 14, \

;k

^ / ,nt ^ A jneement. a Limited Agency Disclosure Agreement, a
Real Estate Purchase Contract, and M..I . *;i.;ig .\gieeuu. »""' . """"H

^ M*•K:

S ill I ake Board of Realtors

T Rud ' ^:a lupin hums. !\'I: 1 Lin.scn prepared these documents the night before this meeting and
r xiated many of them.
15
ti

"^ i

Mr, Hansen 1 .

: •

•

wei e making the deal in reverse and after

ied the documents, Mi Hansen would present them to Mr, Ahlen with the

following proposal: Mr A hlen would be given the oppoi tuiuly

j

'inpinluMy p m hase a small

portion of the I ."S IJ» 10 anM |«« •• '• >H ,»'i option to purchase the remaining land. Because Mr.
Hansen and the Mascaros did not know how many acres Mr, Ahlin would pui dmsv < 11111 ii.;lu 1I111
principle terms -f the Rv <n L j t ^
16.

/

-

.

..

ivei e left blank.

.-resented to the Mascaros at this meeting were unsolicited., and

Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros, who lacked any expertise • ih

fl tl

\ * •! "' H\'tf -state,

on a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel
17.

At no time prior to this meeting had the Mascaros contemplated or asked Mr.

Hansen to prepare a general listing agreement for the property.
18.

The Mascaros were only willing to sign the Listing Agreements at the meeting

because Mr. Hansen's represented that he would only received a commission from \Vetcor's
purchase of the property if those documents were executed.
19.

At this meeting, Mr. Hansen and the Mascaros agreed that the Listing Agreements

would apply to the Wetcor deal and be valid for one day only.
20.

The Mascaros were also willing to sign blank documents because they believed

that Mr Hansen was looking out for their best interests.
21.

Based upon Mr. Hansen's representations of the limited applicability of the

documents and their trust in Mr. Hansen, the Mascaros executed the Real Estate Purchase
Contract, the Option Agreement, and four of the Listing Agreements although at the meeting only
one of the Listing Agreements had a written expiration date. That date was November 15, 1993,
the day after the Sunday meeting.
22.

The expiration date of that Listing Agreement was subsequently changed to

November 15, 1994, and unlike changes to other documents executed by the
Mascaros—including the signature date of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the expiration
date of the Option Agreement presented to the Mascaros at the November 14, 1993

6

meeting—that altered date was not initialed by the Mascaros.
23

After the Sunday meeting, Mr. Hansen altered ilic r \ p n a l i u i

>filn.j il.iit il I i.simg

A g r e e m e n t In N , , v r i i i h n |'» 1004 without the M a s c a r o s ' k n o w l e d g e o r permission.
'1

f* Ir Hansen also wrote an expiration date o f N o v e m b e r 15 1004 on the other

three Listing Agreements aflcr lliry

1

-

or

• ^mi'v ;jon.
,^

" r; \'fv:

Contra.: a:i.'
26.

signed both the Option Agreement and ..v Roa; * ,tate i\. .^use

.i: *-

- I inune\ (link In Mis H,insni foi $4,000.00.

The deal between the Mascaros and Mr. .' i-m failed because the terms and the

conditions of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Optioi i - s gi eei i lent coi 1.1ci i: i : 11: e i i let Foi
in.'J.inrf; Mi

"ililni failed In Liu- the property annexed by an incorporated municipality as

required by one of the addenda to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, nor did he effectuate a
Sectioi I 1031 of the Ii itei i lal Re c i n te Sei <" - ice Cc tie tax fi ee exel lai ige as i e cp nil ed bj tl le
addendum t o the Option Agreement.
27.

Mtn n vague and vain'attempt to arbitrate the issue of the earnest money, 11 n• i ii Ir

coi i lpai ly ewiiiiiiiiK
28.

IHIMM

ni iln % i ildi

m HI I\III Milm's assignees.

After the deal with Mr. Ahlin failed, the Mascaros and Michael Brodsky ("Mr.

Brodsky") began discussions foi the sale of the property, hut nm ^ ni'tnt Jigieenieiil ^ a s f n i n r J
ii ito b y tl ic pai ties.
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29.

In September 1994 and while they were in negotiations with Mr. Brodsky, the

Mascaros signed a one year listing agreement with < 'jinimi A.SMH Mtes,
|,n,pcfiy(n l n , i \ ('.titnur! in (h Inbci of*that same year.
. ^ Mascaros and Tracy Cannon closed on the property on May 11
Tracy Cannon received a sale!; eommissinii lunn llir I'Vhisn
31.

1

09*, and

5.

The Mascaros sold the property to Tracy Cannon under terms better than those

proposed under the Wetcor deal.
•- "

Jlhuiiyh niKitioiiiilly trauinativ:, Mi I lair^n 1 '; conduct did not cause the

Mascaros any compensatory damages or pecuniary loss.
CONCLUSION:
.i !s.,

*:

*. ,«..,,.,,-;,, iMjujirhiS of Fact, the Court hereby enters the following

Conclusions of Law:
1.

I here1 is deaf diiJ i n *hn uii.* i vi li HI t dim llit 1\LI t aios ai.'h*ed In

1 r\y\ tilt il

(lit-1 Jstinf* Agreements under Mr. Hansen's fraudulent inducement.
1

Because the Mascaros were fraudulently induced to enter into the Listing

"Agreements, Jin ft MM » ol'lln 1 i .(mi}1, Agieenrnf . «in nrilhi i hind nig nor enforceable upon any
party.
3.

The Mascaros are not entitled to any damages resulting lioin Mi I laiiisnn'\

iiiiitdiilnii nrpMMMil.ilmns m ln'li(n'ii>i.
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JUDGMENT
In accordance with the foregoing partial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this
Court hereby enters a judgment of no cause as to Plaintiffs First, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for
Relief against the Mascaros and Plaintiffs Second and Fourth Claims for Relief against Mrs.
Cannon. Furthermore, the Court hereby enters a judgment of no cause as to the Mascaros' First,
Third, and Fourth Counterclaims against Wardley and the Hansens, and denies any claims for
relief under the Mascaros5 Second Cause of Action against the Hansens.
,\

Dated this Jt[ dayof January 1999.
BY THE 60URT:
v

7&W-

JMM

Leslie A. Lewis
Third District Court Judge

5-***.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PARTIAL FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT, by causing the same to be mailed, via
first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following, this'^'day of December 1998:

Neil R. Sabin
Attorney for Plaintiff
NIELSON & SENIOR, P.C.
60 East South Temple
Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Mark O. Morris
Attorney for Defendant Cannon.
SNELL & WILMER
111 East Broadway
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Steven B. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

John R. Bucher
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
On this

day of January 1999, pursuant to Rule 77(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

and following entry thereof, I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, viafirstclass mail, postage
prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENT to the following
Neil R. Sabin
Attorney for Plaintiff
NIELSON & SENIOR, P.C
60 East South Temple
Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Mark O Morris
Attorney for Defendant Cannon
SNELL & WILMER
111 East Broadway
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Steven B Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

John R. Bucher
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

James C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendant Mascaro
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
CLERK OF THE COURT

By
Deputy Clerk
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Steven B. Smith, #5797
SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,

)
)

ORDER DENYING
ATTORNEY'S FEES

]
;)
]

Civil No. 940907000 CN

)i

Judge: Leslie A. Lewis

Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO,
TRACEY CANNON and ASSOCIATES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

Defendants Tracey Cannon and Cannon and Associates ("Cannon") and
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro
("Mascaros"), after a trial in the above matter, petitioned the Court for an award of attorney's
fees from PlaintifLTThird Party Defendant, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley"),
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56. Memoranda in support and in opposition to
those Motions were filed and those Motions were submitted for decision. The Court having
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and being fully informed, now makes and enters the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:

FINDINGS OF FACT
?-

JS >tfi Caninins and' Mascaras claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant

to Section 78-27-56 Q) contending that Wardley's claims were meritless and assented in I nl
faith.
2.

Wardley's claims, however, were not "without merit."

3.

6ven though the listing agreeiuan rntnnl between Wardley and the

Masciijijis wetv v< iilah|t. because of the misconduct of Arlis Hansen, the legality of the listing
agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal questions which w/ir IMH nidn-l i It JI
- There was no t-vuictn i prvsnik-il llul Wardley independently knew of Mr. Hansen's
fraudulent conduct, and there was evidence that Wardley strongly believed that i
claim,,, for unpaid comi^ission.

I lu e vidnti. iiidiaifecf

.,

I ,i | Wardley had an honest belief in

ffk propriety of the activities in question; (b) Wardley did not intend to take unconscionable
advantage of others; a^d ( c ) Wardley did not intend h. i .i. I Willi knowledge I hat its
• N'tivihVs wuiid' luiNin t dirlav and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
J-

i^oznc:!? m ' Mascaros failed to deznoz2Strate that Ward)ey's claims were

"frivolous," or "of littl^ weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact" as set forth in
Cady v. Johnson,

< )m

2.

Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith.

3.

The totality of facts and circumstari*

f'uiu* Wanflev lu \m\ Qannons' and Mascaros' attorney's fees.
2

itable to

^HDW$
7^
CL^T~\
DATED this L.I "day of Marchr 1999.

ll><

By the Court:
/

/

/

Judge Leslie Lewis

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the .
day of March, 1999, a true and correct copy of
Wardley's Order Denying Attorney's Fees was deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
James C. Haskins, Esq.
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark O. Morris, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
John Bucher, Esq.
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

^ywdfr'
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"T -4fvng

for attorney's fet
12-99 Filed: Notice to submit for decision oral argument requested-mo
for atty fees
chells
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JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge:

fl
Tracy Cannon (Cannon) and Cannon & Associates, Inc.,
(Associates) appeal from the trial court f s order denying their
request for attorney fees. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
1(2
On November 14, 1993, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro
(Mascaros) and Wardley Better Homes and Gardens signed four
listing agreements (listing agreements) through Wardley's agent,
Aries Hansen (Hansen). The first listing agreement, which was
set to expire the next day, reflects the actual agreement between
the Mascaros and Hansen. The expiration dates on the other three
listing agreements were left blank. Hansen, after obtaining the
Mascaros1 signatures and without their knowledge or approval,
altered the expiration date on the first of the four listing
agreements from November 15, 1993 to November 15, 1994, and
unilaterally filled in the blank expiration dates on the three
other listing agreements with the same fraudulent date. In
September 1994, the Mascaros signed a one-year listing agreement
with Associates as broker. Later, the Mascaros signed a Real
Estate Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the property to
Cannon. The Mascaros and Associates eventually closed on the
sale of the property to Cannon in 1995. Cannon received a
$115,338.16 commission from the sale.
U3
As a result, Wardley brought an action against the Mascaros
to recover a real estate commission under its four listing
agreements. The Mascaros answered Wardley 1 s complaint and
counterclaimed against Wardley. Further, they filed a thirdparty complaint against Hansen and his wife Ruth, claiming
negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and seeking a declaratory
judgment. Wardley filed an amended complaint against Cannon
asserting unlawful interference with contract, conspiracy, and
seeking a declaratory judgement. Cannon filed a motion for
summary judgment, but the trial court denied the motion because
there were "material facts at issue." Wardley then filed, with
the permission of the trial court, a second amended complaint
against Associates for violation of statutes and conversion, in
addition to all of the claims filed in the first amended
complaint against Cannon. After four days of "carefully
evaluating the trial testimony and carefully scrutinizing the
numerous documents entered into evidence," the trial coxirt ruled
against Wardley on all claims. The court concluded that, due to
fraud in the inducement, the listing agreements signed by the
Mascaros were voidable and unenforceable. The court also
concluded that Wardley had failed to meet its burdens of proof on
its claims against Associates. Further, the trial court ruled
that the Mascaros were unable to recover on any of their
counterclaims or third-party claims.
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1)4
Associates, Cannon, and the Mascaros requested attorney fees
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996 and Supp. 1999). The
trial court denied their requests, concluding that Wardley's
claims were not shown to be "without merit" and not brought in
"bad faith," as the statute requires. See Utah Code Ann. § 7827-56 (1996 and Supp. 1999). Cannon and Associates appeal the
trial court's ruling, arguing that the statutory requirements of
section 78-27-56 were satisfied via principles of vicarious
liability, which principles they suppose impute knowledge of
Hansen's fraudulent actions to Wardley. Appellants contend that
even if there was no evidence that Wardley knew of Hansen's fraud
before bringing claims against the Mascaros, Cannon, and
Associates, principles of vicarious liability should still impute
to Wardley the knowledge that the listing agreements under which
Wardley brought suit were obtained by fraud. If such knowledge
is imputed to Wardley, Appellants reason, then Wardley's suit
would be without merit and brought in bad faith, thus entitling
Appellants to attorney fees under section 78-27-56. Appellants
challenge the trial court's ruling as to attorney fees purely as
a matter of law, marshaling no evidence to dispute any issue of
fact.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
15
Section 78-27-56 authorizes the court to award attorney fees
to a prevailing party "if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was [1] without merit and [2] not brought
or asserted in good faith." Id. An appeal from a ruling that
attorney fees are unavailable under section 78-27-56 involves two
standards of review, one for each step of the analysis
respectively.1 Whether a claim is without merit is a question of
1. Citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) and
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
Appellants assert that we should review the attorney fees issue
as a legal question, reviewing only for correctness. Appellants
misstate the standard of review. Where section 78-27-56 is
invoked as a basis for attorney fees, our decisions specify that
"the finding of bad faith is a question of fact and is reviewed
by this court tinder the 'clearly erroneous1 standard." Jeschke
v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "To clarify
the matter: As to whether the party lacked good faith, the trial
court must make a factual finding of a party's subjective intent.
In addition, the trial court must conclude, as a matter of law,
that the action was without merit." Pennington v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n.3 (Utah 1998).
Similarly, Appellants misstate the trial court's findings.
(continued...)
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law which the appellate court reviews for correctness, while a
determination of bad faith is a question of fact and is reviewed
by the appellate court under a clearly erroneous standard. See
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(citations omitted); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d
932, 939 n.3 (Utah 1998).
ANALYSIS
%6
The trial court did not commit reversible error in ruling
that Appellants were not entitled to attorney fees under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996 and Supp. 1999). The statute permits
an award of attorney fees "to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith," subject to
exceptions which do not apply here. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1)
(1996 and Supp. 1999). Where an action is without merit and is
not asserted in good faith, the court, in its discretion, may
deny fees only if it enters in the record the reasons for not
awarding fees under section 78-27-56(1). See id. § (2). Here,
as required by the statute, the trial court stated its reasons
for denying Appellants' request for attorney fees, both in its
Memorandum Decision and in its Order Denying Attorney Fees.
I.

Challenge Based on Statutory Requirements

1(7
A finding of bad faith is a factual question. Jeschke v.
Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus, to
challenge a finding of fact, Appellants must marshal the
evidence, citing the appellate court to all the evidence
supporting trial court's ruling. Then, Appellants must
demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to
the trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support the
challenged finding. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 3 05,
1. (...continued)
They state that "the court found that Wardley, through its agent
Aries Hansen . . . had altered the dates of certain listing
agreements." Further, they state in their brief that the "trial
court found that through its agent, Wardley took full advantage
of its opportunity to deceive the Mascaros . . . ." While the
trial court found that Hansen acted in the manner described,
nowhere in the record is there a finding by the trial court that
Wardley had either altered listing agreement dates or taken full
advantage of an opportunity to deceive.
Lastly, Appellants indicate that Hansen urged Wardley to
initiate its suit, but provide no citations to the record to
support that assertion.
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312 (Utah 1998); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d
1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). Here, Appellants failed to marshal
the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Wardley
did not act in bad faith.2 They explain in their reply brief
that they purposely decided not to marshal the evidence because
they accepted the "purely factual findings of the trial court as
true." Thus, we must "assume [] that the record supports the
findings of the trial court," including the finding that
Wardley's suit was not pursued in bad faith. Saunders v. Sharp,
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) . Consequently, because a finding
of bad faith is required before a court can award attorney fees
under section 78-27-56, our acceptance of this finding as true is
fatal to this appeal.3
II.

Challenge Based on Vicarious Liability

%8
Appellants seek to overcome both of the statutory requirements
by advancing novel theories of vicarious liability. They assert
that Wardley can be required to pay their attorney fees by
utilizing vicarious liability in two ways which are unsupported
by any case law.4 First, they seek to apply vicarious liability,
2. " [L] ack of good faith . . . for the purposes of [Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56], is synonymous with a finding of 'bad faith.'"
Jeschke, 811 P.2d at 204 (quoting Cady v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 149,
151-52 (Utah 1983)).
3. Although the trial court mislabeled its finding as to bad
faith by inserting it under the heading, "Conclusions of Law," we
disregard the label and work to the substance. See Gillmor v.
Write, 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).
4. Appellants rely solely on their theory of vicarious liability
for reversal. Because this theory ultimately fails, we need not
address whether the trial court properly determined if Wardley f s
suit was without merit or was pursued in bad faith pursuant to
section 78-27-56. However, assuming arguendo that we were to
reach this issue, Appellants1 argument still fails. Whether the
listing agreements were legal was unclear. On their face, the
listing agreements seemed legitimate. The trial court was
required to hear a four-day trial and to weigh a significant
amount of evidence to determine otherwise. The record does not
support a finding that Wardley " (i) lacked an honest belief in
the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) . . . intended
to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) . . .
intended to act with the knowledge that [its] activities would
hinder, delay, or defraud others", as is required for a finding
of bad faith. (Childs v. Calahan, 1999 UT App 359,1l6, 993 P.2d
(continued...)
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a theory ordinarily applied only in tort and in limited
circumstances to punitive damages, to attorney fees; specifically
those available under section 78-27-56. Second, they seek to
apply vicarious liability to make the principal liable for the
principal's own actions, rather than the actions of the agent.
Their argument is this: The statutory prongs of a meritless suit
pursued in bad faith can both be satisfied simply by imputing
Hansen's knowledge of his own fraud to Wardley. But Appellants
have cited no legal authority from any jurisdiction in which
attorney fees have been awarded under their novel theory. Even
so, Appellants argue that the general vicarious tort liability
principles set forth in Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151
(Utah 1991) support their assertion.
H9
In Hodges, the court imputed knowledge of a managerial
employee, Cosgrove, to his employer and held his employer liable
for Cosgrovefs intentional malicious prosecution of Hodges. See
id. at 163. There, Cosgrove had acted within the scope of his
authority in initiating the prosecution. See id. However, he
knew but did not reveal the probability that he himself committed
the crime of which Hodges was accused. See id. at 155. The
Hodges court invoked Restatement (Second) of Torts as the basis
for imputing Cosgrove's knowledge to his employer:
In accordance with and subject to the rules
stated in this Topic, the liability of a
principal is affected by the knowledge of an
agent concerning a matter as to which he acts
within his power to bind the principal or
upon which it is his duty to give the
principal information.
Id. at 157 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 272).
However, the court clarified that Cosgrove1s knowledge could be
imputed to his employer only if Cosgrove acted within the scope
of his authority5 and was motivated at least in part to carry out
the employerfs purposes. See id.
ijio Similarly, the Hodges court cited Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 253 to apply vicarious liability to initiation of a legal
action when the agent is authorized to initiate the action. See
4. (...continued)
244 (quoting Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)).
5. Hansen may have had authority to enter into the listing
agreements with the Mascaros; however, he did not, under any
agency theory, have authority to fraudulently change the dates on
those agreements.
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id. But the court only addressed the situation where an
employee, rather than his principal, initiates a tortious legal
action. See id. Thus, Hodcres stands for the proposition that
knowledge of an employee can be imputed to his employer when an
employee tortiously brings a legal action (which is at least
partially motivated to carry out the employer's purposes) if it
is within the scope of the employee's authority to bring the
action. Accordingly, for Appellants to succeed on their claim of
vicarious liability, based on Hodges, they would have to show
that Wardley's suit was brought: (1) in tort, (2) by Hansen who
(3) was acting within the scope of his employment in bringing the
suit. Appellants have not alleged, nor shown, any of these
factors.
Ull Nevertheless, Appellants urge us to stretch the vicarious
liability principles set forth in Hodges as follows: "[W]here
the principal filed legal proceedings at the agents's behest, the
principal has no less liability as the main actor than it would
have if the agent had instituted such proceedings on behalf of
the principal." Appellants cite no authority for this
proposition.6 Instead, they take language from Hodges and remold
it to fit their theory. That is, they recast the passage, "the
liability of a principal is affected by the knowledge of an agent
concerning a matter as to which he acts," id. at 157 (emphasis
added), to mean Wardley's liability is effected by Hansen's
knowledge that Hansen acted fraudulently toward the Mascaros.
What Hodges stands for, however, is that the agent's knowledge of
an opposing party's innocence, at the time the agent tortiously
initiates legal proceedings on behalf of his principal, is
imputed to the principal. In Hodges, Cosgrove, the agent,
initiated the legal action, whereas here, the agent Hansen did
not initiate the action. Hansen Appellants rewrite Hodges,
without citing any authority from any jurisdiction to do so.
There is no legal support for Appellants' claim that vicarious
liability should be applied in a manner that imputes the agent's

6, Appellants, also propose an "unfairness" public policy r
argument to support their position. They argue that unfairness
arises because their vicarious liability theory runs into a
legislative roadblock, which limits the ability to file suits for
real estate commissions to brokers; agents cannot sue. Thus,
unless vicarious liability is invoked, brokers can escape
liability for filing a bad faith claim for commissions even
though encouraged to do so by an agent. This argument does not
persuade us to apply their novel theory of vicarious liability.
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knowledge to the principal to answer for the principal's own
actions.7
CONCLUSION
1(12 Appellants' statutory challenge fails because they did not
marshal the evidence regarding bad faith. Appellants' vicarious
liability argument is without legal justification. Accordingly,
we affirm.

I CONCUR:

William A. Thorne, Jr . , Judge

II i i
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niv. RKr.PiiT

7. Use of vicarious liability as a means of awarding attorney
fees under section 78-27-56 is a task better suited to the
legislature than, to this Court, On a purely theoretical
spectrum, it is possible there is a point at which knowledge may
be imputed to a principal in a case where the principal initiates
a suit based upon fraudulent actions of its agent, but we see no
need to draw that line today
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